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Evaluating Negative Forensic Evidence:
When Do Jurors Treat Absence of
Evidence as Evidence of Absence?
William C. Thompson, Nicholas Scurich,* Rachel Dioso-Villa, and
Brenda Velazquez
Two jury simulation experiments tested participants’ sensitivity to variations in the
probative value of a piece of negative forensic evidence: failure to find gunshot residue
(GSR) on a defendant alleged to have fired a gun. Experiment 1 found that if no GSR was
detected, juries (N5 115) of undergraduates were appropriately less likely to convict a
criminal defendant when the probability of detecting GSR was high than when it was low.
Participants were unaffected by contextualizing expert testimony that emphasized either
the value of the negative evidence for making inductive inferences or that the negative
evidence was inconclusive for making deductions. Experiment 2 used a sample of venire
jurors (N5 420) and manipulated the probability of detecting GSR (0 percent, 50 percent,
60 percent, 90 percent, or 100 percent) given that a gun was fired. Consistent with the first
experiment, venire jurors were more likely to convict when the probability of detection was
0 percent or 50 percent than when it was 100 percent, but verdicts did not differ between
the middle groups. This pattern of results suggests that jurors may evaluate negative
evidence according to a fairly crude metric---giving it no weight if the probability of
detection is zero, a great deal of weight if the probability of detection is 100 percent, and
moderate weight if the probability of detection is somewhere in between.
Sherlock Holmes: [Consider] the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.
Inspector Gregory: The dog did nothing in the night-time.
Holmes: That was the curious incident.
A. Conan Doyle’s, The Silver Blaze
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I. Introduction
Does the absence of a defendant’s fingerprint on an alleged murder weapon mean he
never touched the weapon? Does the absence of detectable drug metabolites in a per-
son’s blood mean the person was drug-free? Questions like these concern the value of
negative evidence. Negative evidence may arise from the failure of an investigation to pro-
duce findings consistent with a particular hypothesis about what occurred. It may also
arise from the nonoccurrence of an event that was likely to occur if a particular hypoth-
esis is true. Negative evidence is generally admissible in jury trials when it is relevant to
a pertinent issue in a case, although courts may exclude it if they find it more prejudi-
cial than probative (e.g., United States v. Hoffman 1992).
In this article we will discuss two issues related to negative evidence. One issue is
the probative value of such evidence: When and to what extent does the failure to find
evidence of an event help prove that the event did not occur? The second issue is the
effect of such evidence in jury trials: When and to what extent do jurors treat negative
evidence as probative? In distinguishing the two issues we are, obviously, acknowledging
a possibility that jurors will assess negative evidence incorrectly, giving such evidence
more (or less) weight than it deserves.
It is important to distinguish negative evidence from missing evidence. Suppose that a
defendant is accused of shooting a victim with a handgun. If the police fail to test for the
presence of gunshot residue (GSR) on the defendant, then we will say that GSR evidence is
missing. If the police test for GSR and do not find it, we will say the evidence is negative.
According to some commentators, the CSI television series has conditioned jurors to expect
forensic science evidence in virtually every case (Podlas 2006; Shelton 2009; Shelton et al.
2006; Tyler 2006). There has been much discussion of whether this “CSI effect” exists and
whether it has made jurors reluctant to convict when forensic evidence is missing (Tyler 2006;
Cole & Dioso-Villa 2007; Schweitzer & Saks 2007). Our focus here, however, is not on cases
in which the parties have failed to conduct an inquiry or examination into a pertinent issue,
but on cases in which such an inquiry has been conducted and the findings were negative.
Negative evidence, as we use that term here, is also distinguishable from evidence
designed to explain or “contextualize” negative or missing findings. According to one legal
scholar, concern about “CSI infection within the jury” has led many prosecutors to pursue a
strategy of “defensive prosecution” in which they present expert testimony to explain “why
certain types of tests were not done,” and why other tests were negative, in order to “curb
unrealistic expectations and misinformation regarding forensic science and its capabilities”
(Lawson 2009). Some commentators have referred to this explanatory testimony as negative
evidence (Lawson 2009:168; Cole & Dioso-Villa 2011). To avoid confusion, we will reserve the
term negative evidence for evidence of nonoccurrence or nondetection, such as the failure of
a toxicology test to find evidence of drugs. Following Jenkins and Schuller (2007), we will
use the term contextualizing evidence to describe expert testimony designed to provide an
explanatory context for negative or missing evidence.
How do jurors respond to negative evidence? We know that people find it difficult
to draw inferences from the absence of information (Einhorn & Hogarth 1978; Ward &
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Jenkins 1965). As Hearst explained, “human beings and other animals have trouble using
the mere absence of something as a basis for efficient and appropriate processing of
information” (1991:432). In studies of operant conditioning, for example, pigeons learn
more quickly that they can obtain food by pecking a lever when the availability of food is
signaled by the presence of a blue light than when it is signaled by the absence of the
blue light—a phenomenon called the “feature positive effect” (Jenkins & Sainsbury
1969). Using slightly different stimuli (symbols rather than lights) and more species-
appropriate rewards, Newman et al. (1980) observed the same effect in undergraduates.
But studies in this area typically require participants to realize without much guid-
ance the significance of events that did not occur or evidence that was not found. Nega-
tive evidence may be easier to appreciate in the context of a jury trial because testimony
about it typically recounts the investigation that yielded the negative findings. An expert
might testify, for example, that a test for gunshot residue was conducted and that none
was found. It may well be easier to see the implications of the GSR that was not found
(after being told that someone looked for it) than to appreciate the implications of the
dog that did not bark, particularly if no one has drawn attention to the dog.
Jenkins and Schuller were the first researchers to study reactions to negative evidence
in a jury simulation study. Mock jurors evaluated a case in which the defendant was accused
of administering a “date-rape” drug to a female acquaintance and then raping her. The
defendant denied giving the woman a drug and claimed his sexual encounter with her was
consensual. The key negative evidence came from toxicology tests on the woman’s blood and
urine, which failed to detect evidence of a date-rape drug. The mock jurors gave consider-
able weight to this negative evidence, but only when it was presented without contextualizing
testimony. When an expert testified that the drugs in question cannot always be detected by
toxicology tests, and, on that basis, suggested that the negative results are “not conclusive
either way” on the question of whether the woman ingested the drugs, jurors gave no weight
to the negative evidence. As Jenkins and Schuller explained, “the expert witness completely
negated the impact of the negative forensic report on participants’ decisions” (2007:377).
Jenkin and Schuller’s findings are groundbreaking and provocative, but (as they
recognized) their study had an important limitation. It is not possible to determine,
based on the materials they presented, how much weight the negative evidence
deserved. So we do not know whether the mock jurors gave the negative evidence too
much or too little weight. We cannot tell, therefore, whether the expert’s contextualiz-
ing testimony was beneficial because it persuaded jurors to disregard evidence that had
little or no probative value; or was prejudicial because it persuaded jurors to disregard
probative evidence that supported the defendant.
To assess the probative value of a negative forensic test, one must have information
about the probability of positive and negative findings under the relevant hypotheses
(Lempert 1977; Lyon & Koehler 1996).1 In most cases, the key variable affecting the
1For example, the value of a negative drug test for proving the woman did not ingest drugs depends on the ratio
of two conditional probabilities: the probability of a negative result if the woman did not ingest drugs and the
probability of a negative result if she did. The probative value of the negative evidence varies directly in propor-
tion to this ratio (which is known as a likelihood ratio).
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value of negative evidence is what we will call the probability of detection. In the drug
case, it would be the probability of obtaining a positive test result if the woman ingested
drugs.2 Statisticians sometimes call this factor the sensitivity of the test. It is also necessary
to know the probability of a false positive, which (in the drug case) would be the proba-
bility of a positive test result if the woman did not ingest drugs. Because the probability
of a false positive is likely to be low for most forensic tests, the probability of detection
will typically be the most important variable affecting value of negative evidence.
Other factors being equal, the probative value of a negative test will vary directly
with the probability of detection. If the probability of detecting a date-rape drug is zero,
then a negative drug test has no value because the test would be negative even if the
woman did ingest drugs. If the probability of detection is one (100 percent), then the
negative drug test is highly probative: it essentially proves that the woman did not ingest
drugs. If a juror truly believed that the probability of detection was 100 percent, and
that drugs were not detected, then whatever the juror’s prior estimate of the odds the
woman ingested drugs, the juror should reduce that estimate to zero.
It is important to realize that negative evidence may have substantial probative
value even if the probability of detection is less than one. Suppose, for example, that
the probability of detection for the drug test is 0.50 (50 percent) and the false positive
rate is zero. In this case, the occurrence of a negative drug test is twice as likely if the
woman did not ingest drugs than if she did. Whatever a juror’s prior estimate of the
odds the woman ingested drugs, the juror should reduce that estimate by half in light of
this evidence. An exposition of this conclusion appears in Appendix A.
When the probability of detection is less than 100 percent, forensic scientists
sometimes dismiss negative evidence as unimportant. Failure to find the defendant’s fin-
gerprint on a murder weapon, for example, is said to have little or no evidentiary value
because there are many possible reasons (other than innocence) for a negative finding:
the defendant might have worn gloves, wiped the weapon, and so forth (Nielson 2005).
When discussing such cases, forensic scientists often cite a well-worn aphorism: “absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Starrs 2006).
This broad dismissal of negative findings is similar to the treatment of negative
findings in hypothesis testing. Scientists have traditionally approached truth using a
deductive logic that involves ruling out hypotheses (Popper 1959). If an investigation
produces findings that cannot be accounted for under a null hypothesis, then the null
hypothesis is rejected (which has the effect of supporting alternative hypotheses). But
what if an investigation fails to produce evidence that can rule out null hypothesis? As
all beginning science students are taught, “negative” findings of this type do not prove
the null hypothesis is true; nor do they prove any alternative hypothesis is false. There
generally are many possible reasons for negative findings, including limitations or
2We will assume for this discussion that detection and nondetection are mutually exclusive and exhaustive events,
and hence that the probability of nondetection is the complement of the probability of detection. Hence, if the
probability of detection is high, then the probability of nondetection is low, and vice-versa.
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inadequacies in the investigation. Consequently, negative findings have little or no value
in the deductive, hypothesis-testing framework.
But evidence that has little value for ruling out a hypothesis may have consider-
able value for making other inferences. In daily life, and in the legal system, people typi-
cally evaluate evidence through induction rather than deduction (Hacking 2001). In an
inductive framework, the absence of evidence can indeed be evidence of absence, even
if the probability of detection is less than one. To the extent evidence is likely to be
found if a particular event occurred, the failure to find that evidence supports an infer-
ence that the event did not occur.
Forensic scientists who give contextualizing testimony about negative findings
sometimes appear to confuse the deductive logic of hypothesis testing with the inductive
logic of evidence evaluation in the courtroom. Indeed, this confusion may be the basis
of the common claim that “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” The contex-
tualizing testimony in the Jenkins and Schuller (2007) study was based on the testimony
of a forensic scientist in the Canadian case of Regina v. Alouache (2003), where the
expert explained that there are a number of reasons why a toxicology test may have
failed to detect drugs in the woman’s blood and urine and, on that basis, concluded
that the test “was not conclusive one way or the other” on the issue of whether the
woman had been drugged. The issue the jury needed to assess, however, was not
whether the test was “conclusive” but whether it was probative. If the test was incapable
of detecting drugs that the defendant had administered to the woman, then (as dis-
cussed above) the negative test result had no probative value. In that case, the prosecu-
tion should have objected to its admission in evidence and the judge should have
excluded it on grounds of irrelevance. If there was at least some chance that the test
could detect drugs the defendant had administered, however, the failure to detect those
drugs supports the hypothesis that the woman was not drugged, even if the evidence
could not conclusively rule out the alternative hypothesis. In that case, the contextualiz-
ing testimony may well have confused and misled the jury by persuading it to give no
weight to evidence that actually supported the defendant’s claim of innocence. Episte-
mologist Ian Hacking (2001) has noted that people can miss or ignore the inductive
value of evidence when evaluating it in a deductive framework. That may well be a dan-
ger when forensic experts “contextualize” negative findings the way the expert did in
Alouache.
Schuller et al. (2013) reported two additional studies of undergraduate mock
jurors’ reactions to a negative drug test in a case where the defendant was accused of
administering a date-rape drug. Because the probability of detection decreases over
time, they varied whether the test was conducted relatively soon after the complainant
was alleged to have ingested the drug (five hours) or after a longer delay (12 hours),
when the probability of detection would be lower. In Study 1, the time-delay variable
had no effect on the weight jurors assigned to a negative drug test. The researchers sug-
gested, however, that the expert’s testimony may not have drawn “sufficient attention to
the relationship between reporting time and the scientific veracity of the report.” In
Study 2, where the expert placed greater emphasis on this relationship, male jurors gave
substantially more weight to the negative findings when the probability of detection was
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higher (five-hour delay) than when it was lower (12-hour delay), whereas female jurors
gave little weight to the negative findings in either condition. The researchers suggest
that female jurors may have been more sympathetic to the complainant and may, as a
result, have been skeptical of the negative evidence in either case, given that even in the
short-delay condition the probability of detection was less than certain. A limitation of
both studies is that it was impossible to estimate precisely the probability of detection at
the two time intervals, and hence it is unclear how much this variable should have influ-
enced jurors’ judgments.
A similar limitation arose in another study of negative evidence. Eerland and Ras-
sin (2012) examined the reactions of Dutch undergraduate law students to evidence
that criminal investigators, after identifying a suspect, had searched unsuccessfully for
additional incriminating or exculpatory evidence. They found that the law students gave
no weight to the negative findings of these investigations. Because it is not clear what
the probability of detection might have been, however, it is difficult to assess whether
this reaction was normatively appropriate.
The experiments reported here explore mock jurors’ reactions to negative evi-
dence in a context in which information about the probability of detection is provided.
We varied the probability of detection experimentally to see how jurors respond to this
key variable. We hypothesized that the weight given to a negative finding would increase
as the probability of detection increases. We also varied the nature of the contextualiz-
ing testimony that was offered to explain the negative finding. In the deductive condition,
the expert emphasized that the negative evidence could not conclusively rule out a par-
ticular hypothesis. In the inductive condition, the expert focused on the value of the nega-
tive evidence for making inferences about the probability of the hypothesis. We
expected that jurors would give less weight to negative evidence when it was accompa-
nied by the deductive contextualizing testimony. We also predicted an interaction—we
expected that participants’ judgments would be more sensitive to the probability of




1. Participants and Procedure
Undergraduates (N5 573) recruited from a university human subjects pool participated
in groups of four to seven. Nineteen percent of the participants were male and 81 per-
cent were female, ranging in age from 18–52, with a median of 20. They read an eight-
page description of the evidence in a hypothetical criminal case, including transcripts of
key testimony by three witnesses, closing arguments by the prosecutor and defense law-
yer, and the judge’s instructions on the legal standard for conviction. They then
responded individually to a one-page questionnaire that asked their “initial reactions to
the case” based on “what you think right now.” The questionnaire asked them to rate
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the strength of the case against the defendant on a seven-point Likert scale and to indi-
cate whether they thought they would vote guilty or not guilty if they were a juror in the
case.
At that point, each group was left alone to deliberate on the case for up to 20
minutes (or until they agreed on a verdict). They were informed that the experimenter
would be monitoring their discussion from behind a one-way window. After deliberation,
the experimenter asked participants to respond individually to a postdeliberation ques-
tionnaire, which began with the same questions as the initial questionnaire, but also
included questions designed as manipulation checks that tested recall of key facts in the
case as well as demographic and background questions about participants. Upon finish-
ing this second questionnaire, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. The entire
procedure took approximately one hour.
2. Experimental Design and Materials
The experimental materials described a hypothetical case in which a young man was
charged with murdering the owner of a grocery store. An eyewitness heard the grocer
arguing with a man, heard a shot fired, and saw a man running from the scene. About
eight minutes later, the police apprehended the defendant, who matched the descrip-
tion provided by the eyewitness. The defendant was running down a street about a mile
from the crime scene when police stopped him. He was not carrying a gun, but a hand-
gun identified as the murder weapon was found in a trash can near the crime scene.
The defendant was taken into custody and his hands and clothing were tested for the
presence of gunshot residue (GSR). The test was negative; no GSR was detected. The
defendant was nevertheless prosecuted based on testimony of the witness who saw the
man running from the crime scene as well as a second witness who identified the defen-
dant as the man who ran past him about a block from the crime scene just after the
shooting. The prosecution also established that the defendant had previously been
employed by the grocer to stock shelves and make deliveries but had been fired several
weeks before the crime for stealing. The defendant denied any involvement in the crime
and claimed he had been running near his home for exercise when he was
apprehended.
After reporting the negative GSR test, a forensic scientist described a study that
the laboratory had conducted to assess its ability to detect GSR from the murder weapon
on the hands and clothing of a shooter. The laboratory asked 10 volunteers to fire the
gun and then to engage in vigorous exercise by running around a track for eight
minutes to simulate the defendant’s alleged actions following the shooting. The lab
then attempted to collect GSR from the hands and clothing of each of the volunteers.
Each volunteer wore the same type of clothing that the defendant was wearing when
apprehended.
In a 3 3 2 between-subjects factorial design, we varied the reported results of the
GSR detection study: GSR was detected on 100 percent, 50 percent, or 0 percent of the
volunteers. We also varied the forensic scientist’s interpretation of the defendant’s
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negative GSR test (deductive or inductive interpretation). In the deductive condition,
the expert claimed that the negative test was uninformative:
Q: Does a negative GSR test prove that a person did not fire a gun?
Expert: No. A negative test doesn’t prove anything one way or the other. There are too many
possible explanations for a negative test. Because you cannot rule out all the other explana-
tions, you cannot say for sure that the person didn’t fire a gun. It is a basic principle of sci-
ence. In order to prove a theory you have to rule out all the alternative theories.
Q: In your opinion, does the negative GSR test on Benjamin Everett prove that he was not the
man who shot Mr. Kim?
Expert: No. The negative test proves nothing because there are other possible explanations
for the negative result.
In the inductive condition, the expert acknowledged that the negative test has
probative value, but claimed it was not definitive:
Q: Does a negative GSR test prove that a person did not fire a gun?
Expert: It reduces the likelihood that the person fired a gun. If you expect to find GSR if the
person fired a gun, and you don’t find it, then you should be less confident that he fired a
gun. It is a basic principle of science. If you get results that are unlikely if a hypothesis is true,
then you should be less confident that the hypothesis is true.
Q: In your opinion, does the negative GSR test on Benjamin Everett prove that he was not the
man who shot Mr. Kim?
Expert: It may reduce the likelihood that he fired a gun, but it does not rule out that
possibility.
The complete experimental stimuli appear in Appendix B.
3. Manipulation Checks
The final questionnaire included a multiple-choice item designed to check whether par-
ticipants correctly recalled the percentage of men in the GSR detection study who had
detectable levels of GSR on their hands and clothing. More than 90 percent of partici-
pants chose the correct percentage, which indicates that this aspect of the evidence was
salient and widely comprehended, and hence that the percentage manipulation was
successful.
The majority of participants (96.3 percent in the inductive condition; 76.3 percent
in the deductive condition) responded correctly to a second item that asked participants
to choose which of four statements most closely reflected the forensic expert’s interpre-
tation of the GSR test results. This finding indicates that most participants correctly
recalled the expert’s statements about his interpretation of the negative GSR test, and
hence that the interpretation manipulation was also successful.
The results reported below do not change depending on whether or not partici-
pants who responded incorrectly to the comprehension questions are included in the
analyses. Therefore, we elected to the include all participants in the analyses to increase
the statistical power of the inferential tests and for reasons of ecological validity, as
actual jurors are not given comprehension check questions nor are they excluded from
deliberation for failing to correctly answer such questions.
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B. Results
A total of 115 juries deliberated. One-third of the juries (n5 39) unanimously voted to
acquit the defendant whereas less than one-quarter of the juries (n5 26) unanimously
voted to convict the defendant. As noted, the size of each jury varied from four to seven
participants with a median of five (IQR5 2) and mode of five participants per jury. The
small number of participants within some of the juries (e.g., four) precluded the use of
hierarchical models to analyze the data (Tabachnick & Fidell 2013). Consequently, an
alternative approach was utilized to analyze the data: examining the proportion of jurors
voting to convict within each jury. The proportion of jurors voting to convict within
each jury was calculated by taking the number of jurors voting to convict and dividing it
by the total number of jurors within the jury. Thus, values could range from 0 to 1.
Note that this approach leaves the unit of analysis at the jury (group level), which is
appropriate since individuals interacted within groups and thus created interdependen-
cies among their responses.
A 2 3 3 ANOVA with probability of detection and inductive versus deductive
interpretation as the independent variables and percentage voting to convict as the
dependent variable detected a significant main effect for probability of detection (F(2,
114)5 5.91, p5 0.004, gp
25 0.098). The main effect for inductive versus deductive was
not significant (F(1, 115)5 2.04, p5 0.156), nor was the interaction (F(2, 115)< 1). The
main effect for the probability of detection is plotted in Figure 1.
As is apparent, the proportion of jurors who voted to convict decreased as the
probability of detection increased. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni) revealed that the
difference between the 0 percent and 100 percent conditions was statistically significant
(p5 0.004), as was the difference between the 50 percent and 100 percent conditions
(p5 0.047), but the difference between the 0 percent and 50 percent conditions was
not significant (p5 1.0).
Figure 1: Proportion of participants within juries voting to convict as a function of the
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We next examined perceptions of the strength of the case against the defendant
(i.e., the strength of the case against the defendant rated on a seven-point Likert scale),
which potentially could be more sensitive to the experimental manipulations than binary
verdicts. Because deliberation may have created intraclass correlations within juries, we
aggregated the pre- and postdeliberation data by jury and performed a 2 3 3 analysis of
variance on the mean strength of case rating for each jury (effectively treating jury as the
unit of analysis), and found similar results. For predeliberation ratings, we found a main
effect for probability of detection, F(2,114)5 6.38, p5 0.002, gp
25 0.105, but no significant
effect for inductive versus deductive interpretation (F< 1), and no significant interaction
(F(2,114)5 1.12, p5 0.33). For postdeliberation ratings, we again found a significant main
effect of probability of detection, F(2,114)5 3.16, p< 0.05, gp
25 0.055, with no effect of
interpretation and no interaction (both Fs< 1). Post-hoc comparisons found that mean
postdeliberation ratings in the 0 percent condition were significantly higher than in the
100 percent condition (p< 0.05), while mean estimates in the 50 percent condition failed
to differ significantly from those in the 0 percent and 100 percent conditions (both
ps> 0.05). Thus, the main effect for the probability of detection holds whether one exam-
ines binary verdicts or the strength of case ratings.
Table 1 displays the group mean ratings of the strength of case in the six experi-
mental conditions, both before and after group deliberation. In general, and as
expected, the strength of case ratings decreased with increases in the probability of
detection in the GSR study.
Table 1: Mean Pre- and Postdeliberation Strength of Case Ratings (with Standard
Deviation) Decomposed by Experimental Condition
Percent with Detectable GSR
Contextualizing Testimony 0% 50% 100% Total
Predeliberation
Deductive
Mean strength of case 5.23 4.90 4.85 5.01
(sd) (0.59) (0.63) (0.43) (0.58)
Inductive
Mean strength of case 5.14 5.05 4.69 4.96
(sd) (0.31) (0.61) (0.52) (0.53)




Mean strength of case 4.81 4.76 4.31 4.62
(sd) (1.14) (1.07) (0.83) (1.03)
Inductive
Mean strength of case 4.91 4.72 4.38 4.68
(sd) (0.82) (0.92) (0.78) (0.86)




The first question we sought to answer with this experiment is whether people consider
the probability of detection (under relevant hypotheses) when evaluating a negative test
result. It appears that they do. Strength of case ratings and the proportion of partici-
pants voting to convict were both significantly lower in the 100 percent condition, where
the probability of detection was high, than in the 0 percent condition, where the proba-
bility of detection was low. As logic dictates, participants gave more weight to the nega-
tive evidence (which favored the defendant) when GSR was detected on all the test
subjects who fired the murder weapon than when GSR was detected on none of them.
When the probability of detection was high, participants clearly treated the absence of
(GSR) evidence as evidence of (GSR’s) absence—that is, as evidence that the defendant
did not fire the gun and was therefore innocent.
Although participants in the 100 perent condition gave considerable weight to the
negative GSR test, they obviously did not view it as fully exculpatory because the convic-
tion rate in this condition was not zero. Comments during deliberation indicated that
jurors had various doubts about the negative GSR test. They thought there might be rea-
sons for the negative result that were not reflected in the results of the GSR detection
study—for example, the defendant washed his hands, changed his clothes, wore gloves;
the laboratory botched the test. While they clearly thought the probability of detection
was higher in the 100 percent condition than in the 0 percent condition, those in the 100
percent condition did not accept that the chances of detection were really 100 percent.
The second question we sought to answer with this experiment was whether
“contextualizing testimony” affects people’s reactions to negative evidence. The testi-
mony we presented did not significantly affect the weight given to the negative evidence.
We had also expected that inductive testimony might increase sensitivity to the probabil-
ity of detection, creating an interaction between probability of detection and contextual-
izing testimony, but the expected interaction was not statistically significant. We can
only speculate about the reasons we failed to detect an effect of contextualizing testi-
mony. Although the failure could conceivably have arisen from a lack of statistical
power,3 we see no trend in the data that would support that conclusion. The explana-
tion may simply be that our participants paid more attention to the evidence itself (i.e.,
to the substance of the negative finding) than to the expert’s commentary about how
that finding should be interpreted. They may have ignored the expert’s guidance on
what the finding meant because they had the confidence to draw their own conclusions.
The third question we sought to answer with this experiment was how people evalu-
ate negative evidence when there is a substantial chance of nondetection, as was the case
in the 50 percent condition. Because there was only a 50 percent chance of detection, the
negative GSR evidence in this condition cannot rule out the hypothesis that the defendant
fired the gun. Consequently, this evidence deserves little or no weight in a deductive,
3Assuming a medium effect size and Type I error rate of 5 percent, Experiment 1 required more than 35 partici-
pants per cell to obtain power greater than 0.80 (Cohen 1992). Note that Experiment 1 had approximately 100
participants per cell.
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hypothesis-testing framework. In an inductive framework, however, it should substantially
decrease jurors’ estimates of the odds the defendant fired the gun. We were interested to
see whether estimates in the 50 percent condition would differ from those in the 0 percent
condition, which would indicate whether or not jurors were giving weight to the negative
evidence. We were also interested in whether the expert’s contextualizing testimony would
influence the weight (if any) given to negative evidence in this condition.
We found that regardless of the contextualizing testimony or the dependent vari-
able (verdicts or strength of evidence ratings) there were no significant differences
between the 50 percent condition and the 0 percent condition, which indicates that
jurors gave little or no weight to the negative evidence in the 50 percent condition.
While strength of case ratings and conviction rates were consistently a bit lower in the
50 percent condition (hinting that jurors might be giving a bit of weight to the negative
evidence that this study lacked the sensitivity to detect), the results do not allow us to
conclude that jurors gave any weight at all to negative evidence when the probability of
detection (in the GSR detection study) was only 50 percent.
One possible interpretation of the findings of Experiment 1 is that jurors give
weight to negative evidence only when the probability of detection is 100 percent. We
have doubts about this interpretation, however, because jurors clearly thought the prob-
ability of detection was lower than 100 percent in the 100 percent condition, due to fac-
tors not taken into account by the GSR detection study, but they nevertheless were
influenced by the negative GSR evidence in that condition. But it may be the case that a
juror’s subjective estimates of the probability of detection must pass some threshold
value before the juror takes negative evidence seriously. Perhaps a 50 percent probability
of detection did not meet that threshold.
One important limitation of Experiment 1 was that participants were undergradu-
ates rather than actual members of a jury pool. We worried that bright undergraduates
at a fairly selective university might be better at drawing conclusions from scientific and
statistical evidence than many actual jurors. So we decided to replicate Experiment 1
using a sample drawn from a pool of actual jurors.
III. Experiment 2
A. Method
1. Procedure and Participants
Participants were members of the jury pool at a courthouse in a large, relatively affluent
suburban county. On days when this experiment was conducted, the courthouse staff
announced to the jurors, as they were about to be released, that they had the opportunity
to remain in the jury assembly room to take part in a university study of juror decision
making. They were offered $10 as an incentive for participation. As part of the consent
process, those who expressed interest in the study were given a brief study information
sheet. Those who chose to participate after reading the sheet were given experimental
booklets to read and complete. The rate of participation among those being released
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varied from day to day, but generally appeared to be about 50 percent. Participants read
the experimental booklets and answered questions individually; because no room was avail-
able where discussions could take place, this study did not include jury deliberation. Most
participants were able to read the materials and complete the questionnaire in 20–30
minutes. At that point, they returned their booklets to the researcher, who answered any
questions they had about the study, thanked them, and paid them $10.
Forty-one percent of the participants (N5 420) were male and 59 percent were female,
ranging in age from 19–77, with a median of 40. As a group they were relatively well-educated:
54 percent had graduated from a four-year college or university and 17 percent also had a gradu-
ate degree. When asked to place themselves on a spectrum of political beliefs, the modal answer
(35 percent) was “moderate”; 23 percent placed themselves on the “liberal” side of the spectrum
and 40 percent on the “conservative” side. About equal numbers were registered Republicans
(33 percent) and Democrats (32 percent). A question designed as a manipulation check asked
them to report what the expert had said about the results of the GSR detection study by circling
either one of 11 percentages (0 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, . . ., 100 percent) or the words
“Don’t know.” Most participants (87 percent) accurately recalled what the expert had said.
2. Experimental Design and Materials
Experiment 2 was designed to be a replication of Experiment 1 with a different partici-
pant population. However, there were several differences in the experimental design.
First, given that the inductive versus deductive interpretation manipulation was ineffec-
tive previously, it was omitted in this experiment. Second, the stimulus materials were
modified so that the GSR evidence would be a more prominent and important part of
the case. In the new version, there were only two witnesses: an eyewitness who confi-
dently identified the defendant as the shooter, and a forensic scientist who testified that
no GSR particles were detected in samples collected from the defendant’s hands and
clothing shortly after the crime. As in the previous experiment, the expert also pre-
sented the results of a GSR detection study. The independent variable in Experiment 2
was the reported results of this study. There were five experimental conditions in which
the expert testified that 0 percent, 50 percent, 60 percent, 90 percent, or 100 percent of
men tested under conditions similar to the crime had detectable levels of GSR on their
hands and clothing. Although the expert testified that “there are a number of reasons
you could get a negative finding,”4 he did not offer an opinion on whether (or to what
extent) the absence of GSR proved the defendant had not fired a gun. Hence, there
was no testimony comparable to either the inductive or deductive testimony in Experi-
ment 1. The purpose of manipulating the detection probability is to explore the possi-
bility, raised by Experiment 1, that the detection probability must pass some threshold
before jurors will give serious weight to a negative test result.
4The expert elaborated as follows: “One possibility is that the individual was not near a firearm that was dis-
charged. Another possibility is that the GSR particles were removed before the test through physical activity,
hand washing, or weather conditions. Another possibility is that the firearm failed to produce a sufficient quan-
tity of GSR to be detectable by the test. A final possibility could be a problem in the collection process, such as
improper use of the collection kit.”
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B. Results
Table 2 shows mean strength of case ratings and conviction rates in the five experimen-
tal conditions. (In Experiment 2, participants rated strength of case on a 10-point Likert
scale.)
A one-way ANOVA detected significant differences between the experimental con-
ditions in the strength of case ratings, F(4,412)5 4.73, p5 0.001, gp
25 0.044. Post-hoc
comparisons (Bonferroni) found that the 100 percent condition differed significantly
from both the 0 percent condition (p5 0.001) and the 50 percent condition
(p5 0.033), but no other differences were significant.
A binary logistic regression model with the experimental conditions as the inde-
pendent variables and verdict (guilty or not guilty) as the dependent variable was con-
ducted (v25 21.55, df5 4, p< 0.001), and detected a significant main effect for the
independent variable (Wald5 20.02, df5 4, p< 0.001). The odds of conviction were
4.59 times greater among participants who were told the probability of detection was 0
percent than among those told it was 100 percent (95 percent CI [2.35, 8.97] (B5 1.52,
Wald5 19.91, p< 0.001). Similarly, the odds of conviction were over twice as high
among participants told that the detection probability was 50 percent, 60 percent, and
90 percent detection probability compared to those told it was 100 percent detection
probability (exp(B)5 2.29, 95 percent CI [1.19,4.41], B 50.827, Wald5 6.09, p5 0.014;
exp(B)5 2.12, 95 percent CI [1.10, 4.10], B5 0.750, Wald5 4.97, p5 0.026;
exp(B)5 2.31, 95 percent CI [1.89,4.50] B5 0.838, Wald5 6.08, p5 0.014; respectively).
Deviation contrasts revealed that conviction rates in the 0 percent condition (61.3 per-
cent) were significantly higher than in the other four conditions (all ps< 0.05) and con-
viction rates in the 100 percent condition (25.6 percent) were significantly lower than
those in the other conditions (all ps< 0.05), but conviction rates in the 50 percent con-
dition (44 percent), 60 percent condition (42.2 percent), and 90 percent condition
(44.3 percent) did not differ significantly from one another.
C. Discussion
This experiment demonstrates that strength of case ratings and conviction rates varied
across conditions in a manner that corresponded very roughly to the probative value of
the negative evidence: conviction rates were highest in the 0 percent condition, were
moderate in the 50 percent, 60 percent, and 90 percent conditions (which did not
Table 2: Strength of Case Ratings and Verdicts (Experiment 2)
Percent with Detectable GSR
0% 50% 60% 90% 100%
Mean strength of case 7.47a 7.08a 6.68ab 6.66ab 6.12b
Percentage voting guilty 61.3a 44.0b 42.2b 44.3b 25.6c
(n) (80) (84) (83) (79) (82)
NOTE: Numbers that do not share the same superscript letter differ significantly, p< 0.05.
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significantly differ from one another), and were lowest in the 100 percent condition.
This pattern of findings is similar to that in Experiment 1, despite the fact that Experi-
ment 2 used an entirely different participant pool. Notably, this pool of participants—
venire jurors—is quite high in external validity, uncharacteristically so for jury research
(see Bornstein 1999).
Although the results are in the appropriate direction, assessments of the strength
of the negative evidence do not appear to have been well calibrated. Jurors gave as
much weight to the negative GSR evidence when the probability of detection in the
GSR detection study was 50 percent as when it was 90 percent, but there was a big drop
in the conviction rate when the percentage went from 90 percent to 100 percent. In
other words, the difference in probability of detection between 90 percent and 100 per-
cent had more of an impact on jurors’ verdicts than the difference between 50 percent
and 90 percent. It may be that jurors were particularly impressed by the 100 percent
detection rate because it seemed to foreclose one possible explanation for the negative
findings. When GSR is detected on 100 percent of the test subjects, then jurors must
posit the existence of some factor not accounted for in the detection study to explain
the negative test results (assuming the defendant is guilty). If GSR is detected on only
90 percent of test subjects, then jurors have a readier explanation for the absence of
GSR on defendant—he may simply have been one of the 10 percent for whom GSR was
undetectable. The pattern of results suggests that jurors may evaluate negative evidence
according to a fairly crude metric—giving it no weight if the probability of detection is
zero, a great deal of weight if the probability of detection is 100 percent, and moderate
weight if the probability of detection is somewhere in between.
IV. General Discussion
Forensic scientists sometimes argue that negative evidence has no value because
“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence” (Starrs 2006; Nielson 2005). We have
shown that this argument is misleading. Negative evidence (the failure to find some-
thing) is indeed evidence that the thing sought was “absent” to the extent the probabil-
ity of detection exceeds the probability of a false positive. The claim that such evidence
has no value arises from a misapplication of the deductive logic of hypothesis testing in
a legal context that requires inductive inferences.
To evaluate negative evidence, triers of fact need information about the probabil-
ity of detection. If the probability of detection is unknown, the probative value of nega-
tive evidence is speculative and cannot be meaningfully assessed. Courts should consider
carefully whether negative evidence should even be admitted under such circumstances.
Courts should also consider excluding negative evidence when the probability of detec-
tion is known to be low. In such cases, negative evidence has little or no probative value
but may carry substantial risk of prejudice.
Our findings suggest that “contextualizing testimony” can play an important role in
helping the jury understand negative evidence when it provides information about the probabil-
ity of detection. Our results indicate that jurors appreciate the general implications of the
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probability of detection and respond in the appropriate direction to such data when evalu-
ating negative evidence. We are skeptical, however, about the value of “contextualizing
testimony” like that presented in Regina v. Alouache (2003), where the expert stated that
negative results are inherently inconclusive without providing data on the probability of detec-
tion. As Jenkins and Schuller (2007) showed, such testimony can negate the value of nega-
tive evidence, leading jurors to give it no weight. While this result would be appropriate if
the probability of detection was low, it could cause jurors to undervalue the negative evi-
dence if the probability of detection was moderate or high. Consequently, we believe
“contextualizing testimony” should be allowed only when the expert can provide informa-
tion that helps the trier of fact assess the probability of detection. Testimony that consists
solely of aphorisms (“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”) or conclusory state-
ments (“negative evidence is not conclusive either way”) may be misleading when the prob-
ability of detection is unknown, or when it is high.
Although jurors seem to understand the general implications of the probability of
detection for the probative value of negative evidence, Experiment 2 found relatively
poor calibration between probability of detection and the weight given to negative evi-
dence. Poor calibration is hardly surprising given people’s well-known tendency to make
probabilistic judgments according to simplifying heuristics rather than Bayesian calcula-
tions (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Koehler 2001; Koehler & Mac-
chi 2004). Deviations between Bayesian norms and actual human performance have
been a rich source of insight into human cognitive process. Future research into the
deviations that arise when reasoning about negative evidence could contribute usefully
to psychological theory. Research on this topic could also provide insights on construct-
ing persuasive arguments about negative evidence and improving people’s reasoning
about it.
In future studies it would be interesting (and useful) to study negative evidence in
cases where jurors take seriously the claim that the probability of detection is 100 per-
cent. In the experiments reported here, jurors clearly did not accept that GSR was cer-
tain to be detected if the defendant fired the murder weapon, even when GSR was
found on 100 percent of subjects in the detection study. Whether jurors will view nega-
tive evidence as conclusive in cases where they acknowledge that the probability of
detection is certain remains unclear (and is worthy of further study). Another sugges-
tion for future researchers is that they ask participants to indicate their subjective assess-
ment of the probability of detection and the probability of a false positive. Information
about jurors’ subjective assessments of these key variables will make it easier to assess
the appropriateness of their judgments, relative to Bayesian norms, than was possible in
the experiments reported here. Future research should also test the generality of our
findings to other types of negative evidence and other types of cases.
Expert testimony about how to interpret negative evidence is one possible way to
improve the calibration of jurors’ responses to such evidence. Proposals to allow experts
to present “decision aids” that illustrate the implications of Bayes’s rule have been
debated for many years and raise a number of potential problems (Saks & Thompson
2003; Kaye 1988; Tribe 1971; Finkelstein & Fairley 1970). It is undoubtedly too early to
decide, as a matter of policy, whether (and when) such testimony is desirable in cases
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involving negative evidence, but it is not too early for researchers to begin examining
the issue.
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Appendix A
Suppose that a forensic scientist conducted a study in which 10 participants fired a gun
and were then tested for the presence of gunshot residue (GSR). Suppose that 50
percent of these participants tested positive for GSR. These figures appear in the center
column of the table below:
Did Fire Gun (G) Did Not Fire Gun (NG)
Positive Test Result (1) 5 0
Negative Test Result (–) 5 10
10 10
It is easy to see that if 10 people did fire a gun (G), the test for GSR would come
back positive (1) for five of the 10 people. Formally, p(1|G)5 5/10 or 50 percent.
We make the simplifying assumption that the false positive rate is zero—in other
words, not a single person who did not fire a gun will test positive for GSR. This
assumption implies that if 10 people did not fire a gun (NG), the test would come back
negative for all 10 people. In formal terms, p(–|NG)5 10/10 or 100 percent.
The likelihood ratio for a negative GSR test result is simply the ratio of these
conditional probabilities: (p(–|NG)5 100%)/(p(1|G)5 50%) or 2.
Since the numerator of the likelihood ratio is fixed (based on the assumption
that the false positive rate is zero), it is clear that the likelihood ratio depends on the
size of the denominator (i.e., p(1|G)): the ratio will decrease as the denominator
becomes larger and increase as the denominator becomes smaller. For example, when
p(1|G)5 20 percent, the likelihood ratio is 5, whereas when p(1|G)5 80 percent, the
likelihood ratio is 1.25. Thus, the probative value of a negative test result directly




Mr. Lee Kim, a 58-year-old Korean-American, was shot and killed in front of his grocery
store on the corner of Adams Street and 8th Avenue in the City of Astoria, New York.
The crime occurred about 10:05 p.m. on July 3, 2004.
At 10:06 p.m., Marion Johnson, a 72-year-old retired school librarian, called a
“911” operator and reported the shooting. Johnson lives in a second-floor apartment
above Kim’s store. She told the “911” operator that she had heard Mr. Kim arguing with
someone. She heard Mr. Kim shout “Benjie, no” and then heard a gunshot. When she
looked out the window she saw a tall blond man running away from the grocery store,
heading west on 8th Avenue. He was wearing a gray shirt with the number “2” on the
back. She then noticed Mr. Kim lying on the sidewalk in front of his store and called
“911.” The “911” operator alerted police to be on the lookout for a man matching the
description provided by Mrs. Johnson.
At approximately 10:13 p.m., officer Brian Wilcox of the Astoria Police
Department observed a tall blond man running along 9th Avenue, about a mile west of
the scene of the crime. The man was wearing a New York Yankees baseball jersey and a
pair of jeans. It was a “Derek Jeter” jersey with a large number 2 on the back. (Derek
Jeter is a member of the New York Yankees baseball team). Officer Wilcox stopped the
man for questioning.
The man identified himself as Benjamin Everett and produced a driver’s license
showing his address as a nearby apartment on 9th Avenue. He said was running for
exercise and denied any involvement in the shooting. He was not carrying a gun.
Because Everett matched the description of the shooter, Officer Wilcox took him into
custody and escorted him, on foot, to a nearby police substation for questioning. At
about 10:45 p.m., Herbert DiFonso, a technician from the Astoria Crime Laboratory,
took samples from Everett’s hands and clothing to be tested for the presence of
gunshot residue (GSR).
Police and emergency personnel arrived at the scene of the shooting within five
minutes of Mrs. Johnson’s call. Mr. Kim had a fatal gunshot wound to his chest and was
dead on arrival at a local hospital. A police officer found a handgun at the bottom of a
trashcan just west of the crime scene.
The police asked the victim’s wife whether her husband knew a blond man
named Benjie. Mrs. Kim reported that a young man from the neighborhood named
Benjie Everett had worked for her husband in the past, helping to unload deliveries
and stock the store. She reported that her husband had fired Benjie Everett several
weeks earlier due to suspicion that he was stealing money from the cash register. Mrs.
Kim identified Benjamin Everett as the “Benjie” who had worked for her husband.
The next day the police had Benjamin Everett appear in a lineup with five other
men of similar appearance. Marion Johnson observed the lineup through a one-way win-
dow. She was not told which person in the lineup was the suspect. However, she
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immediately pointed to Benjamin Everett and said: “That’s the man I saw. That’s him.”
Based on this evidence, Everett was arrested and charged with murder.
The crime laboratory examined the handgun found near the crime scene. It was a
9 mm automatic. Because it had been partially immersed in oily water at the bottom of the
trashcan, no fingerprints could be found on it. However, a firearms examiner was able to
confirm that this gun had fired the fatal bullet that killed Mr. Kim. The results of the gunshot
residue (GSR) test on Everett’s hands and clothing were negative. No GSR was detected.
Key Testimony at Trial
Testimony of Mrs. Marion Johnson
Q: Mrs. Johnson, can you tell the jury what you were doing the evening of July 3rd, 2004?
Mrs. Johnson: I was sitting in my living room watching television.
Q: What did you hear while you were watching TV?
Mrs. Johnson: I remember hearing Mr. Kim locking up his store like he has for 10 years.
Q: What time did you hear Mr. Kim locking up?
Mrs. Johnson: He always closes the grocery story at 10 o’clock, so it was shortly after that. Also
“Law & Order” had just come on, and I never miss “Law & Order”. That’s how I know it was
just after 10.
Q: So just after 10 pm you heard Mr. Kim locking up his store for the evening. What did you
hear next?
Mrs. Johnson: I heard Mr. Kim start talking to another man and then I heard some angry
words and scuffling. And Mr. Kim said, “Benjie. No!” And then I heard that awful gun shot. It
echoed right up to my apartment. It was just terrible.
Q: Did it sound like there was an altercation between Mr. Kim and the other man before the
shot was fired.
Mrs. Johnson: That’s right. Poor Mr. Kim.
Q: What did you do after you heard the gun shot?
Mrs. Johnson: I ran to my window to see what had happened. I saw Mr. Kim lying on the sidewalk
and I saw that man [indicating defendant Benjamin Everett] running away.
Q: Are you certain that the defendant, Benjamin Everett was the man you saw?
Mrs. Johnson: Yes, I recognized him the next day in the police lineup. He is the same man.
I’m sure of it.
Testimony of Herbert DiFonso, Criminalist from the Astoria Crime Laboratory
Q: I understand that you tested for the presence of gunshot residue or GSR on the
defendant?
Mr. DiFonso: Yes. I collected samples from him shortly after the shooting. I tested those
samples for GSR.
Q: Before we get into the details, can you tell the jury what GSR is?
Mr. DiFonso: When a firearm is discharged, hot gases created by the explosion of the primer
tend to spray out, carrying with them inorganic residue from the primer. That residue can
often be detected on the hands and clothing of someone who was near the gun when it was
fired. We call that residue gunshot residue or GSR. It generally consists of round particles
containing a combination of three elements: lead, barium and antimony.
Q: How do you test for GSR?
Mr. DiFonso: We collect samples using an adhesive tape device, sometimes called an adhesive
stub or lift. We press the adhesive substance onto the skin and clothing and it lifts off GSR
particles, if they are present. We then examine the material on the lifts microscopically to see
whether any suspicious particles are present. If it appears that GSR is present, we confirm that
it is GSR by testing for the presence of lead, barium and antimony. We use a procedure
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known as SEM/EDS, which stands for scanning electron microscopy with energy dispersive
x-ray spectrometry detection. It is the most accurate test available.
Q: Now in this case did you attempt to find GSR on Mr. Everett?
Mr. DiFonso: Yes, I took lifts from his hands and his clothing. But they did not contain any
detectable amounts of GSR. So the findings were negative.
Q: What possible explanations might there be for a negative finding?
Mr. DiFonso: Well, there are a number of reasons you could get a negative finding. One
possibility is that the individual was not near a firearm that was discharged. Another possibility
is that the GSR particles were removed before the test through physical activity, hand washing,
or weather conditions. Another possibility is that the firearm failed to produce a sufficient
quantity of GSR to be detectable by the test. A final possibility could be a problem in the
collection process, such as improper use of the collection kit.
Q: If you get GSR on you can you wipe it off?
A: You can remove GSR from hands with soap and water. To remove it from clothing you
usually have to run it through the laundry.
Q: Did you do any tests of the murder weapon in this case to see how much GSR it produced?
Mr. DiFonso: Yes, we conducted a study in which we attempted to replicate the conditions of
the shooting in this case to check our ability to detect GSR from that particular handgun.
Q: Can you describe the study?
Mr. DiFonso: We had ten different volunteers from the lab fire the murder weapon. Each was
wearing a Yankees jersey of the same type the defendant was wearing. After each man fired the
gun, we had him engage in vigorous exercise by running around a track for about eight minutes,
which we estimate is the length of time between when Mr. Kim was shot and when the defendant
was stopped by the officer. We then waited about another 20 minutes and attempted to collect
GSR from the hands and clothing of each man.
Q: And what did you find?
[0% Condition:
Mr. DiFonso: We did not find detectable levels of GSR on any of the men. We think that the handgun in
question has particularly tight construction and produces relatively little backwash of GSR, so relatively
little was deposited in the first place. Then the motion of running combined with sweating probably
removed what little was there, leaving an insufficient amount to detect.
Q: Out of ten men who fired the murder weapon, you didn’t find GSR on any of them?
50%/60%/90% Conditions:
Mr. DiFonso: We found detectable levels of GSR on the hands and clothing of [five/six/nine] of the ten
men. We think that the handgun in question has particularly tight construction and produces relatively
little backwash of GSR, so relatively little was deposited in the first place. Then the motion of running
combined with sweating probably knocked off some of what was there, so that not all of the men had
enough left to detect
Q: So, out of ten men who fired the weapon, you found GSR on [five, six, nine]?]
[100% Condition:
Mr. DiFonso: We found detectable levels of GSR on the hands and clothing of all ten men.
Q: So, out of ten men who fired the weapon, you found GSR on all ten?]
Mr. DiFonso: That is correct.
Closing Arguments
Prosecutor
The evidence leaves no doubt about who committed this crime. Marion Johnson heard Mr.
Kim arguing with a man he called “Benjie.” She saw a tall blond man running away from the
crime scene. She told police the killer was wearing a gray shirt with the number 2 on the back.
And sure enough, a few minutes later Officer Wilcox saw the defendant running down the
street just west of the crime scene wearing a gray Derek Jeter baseball jersey with the number
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2 on the back. The next day Mrs. Johnson was able to pick the defendant out of a police line
up. She recognized him immediately as the man she saw running from the crime scene.
The defense lawyer is going to get up here and talk about GSR because that’s about all
he has to talk about. Yes, it is true that the crime lab found no GSR on Benjamin Everett. But
there could be lots of reasons for that. Maybe he wiped it off. Maybe there wasn’t enough to
detect. Mr. DiFonso told you about the test they did in which ten men fired the murder weapon.
[(0% Condition): When they tested those men they didn’t find GSR on any of them. So
there was no chance they would find GSR on the defendant after he fired the gun][(50% and
60% conditions): Mr. DiFonso told you about the test they did in which ten men fired the murder
weapon. When they tested those ten men they found GSR on only five of them. So it was pretty
much a toss up whether they would find GSR on the defendant after he fired the gun.] [(90%
condition): Mr. DiFonso told you about the test they did in which ten men fired the murder
weapon. When they tested those ten men they found GSR on only nine of them. [Note: the
italicized section was omitted in the 100% condition].
So it was not certain that they would find GSR on the defendant after he fired the gun.
How many men do you think there are in Astoria who have blond hair, who were
running in the street right after the murder wearing a Derek Jeter jersey, who knew Mr.
Kim and probably had a grudge against him, who look so much like the killer that an
eyewitness would pick them out of a line up, and who answer to the name Benjie? I’ll
tell you how many. There is only one and he is sitting right there in front of you.
Defense Lawyer
Mrs. Johnson is an elderly lady. She was on the second floor, looking down, during the
night. How good a look could she have gotten at the man running from the crime
scene? You can’t trust an identification made under those circumstances. We know that
eyewitnesses can be unreliable. It’s not that they are lying. They are just honestly
mistaken. It happens all the time.
Mrs. Johnson claims to have heard Mr. Kim say something that sounded like the
name “Benjie”. Well Benjie is a common name, if it was even a name Mr. Kim spoke.
We’ll never know for sure.
Fortunately, we have some solid scientific evidence in this case—the GSR test. If
Benjamin Everett shot Mr. Kim there should have been gunshot residue on his hands
and his clothing. But the crime lab found no GSR on his hands and no GSR on his
clothing. That is because the police arrested the wrong man. There would have been no
time for him to wash his hands or launder his clothes. Benjamin Everett did not shoot
anyone. That’s why there was no GSR.
[50% Condition/60% Condition/90% Condition/100% Condition: Mr. DiFonso told you
about his experiment. He had ten men fire the murder weapon. When they tested those men [five/
six/nine/all ten] of them had GSR. So if the defendant fired the gun there is a [50%/60%/
90%100%] chance he would have GSR on him. But he didn’t have any.][Note: this
paragraph was omitted in the 0% condition]
Ben Everett just had the misfortune to be out jogging on the night of the murder
and to be dressed in a manner similar to the killer. There are lots of young men in this
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area who have blond hair and wear Derek Jeter shirts. The Yankees must have sold
thousands of those shirts.
Judge’s Instructions
If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed this
murder, then you must find him guilty. It is not required that the state prove guilt beyond
all possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt
based upon reason and common sense—the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable
person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such
a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it.
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